

The Philosopher Li Zehou

His Thought and His Legacy

Edited by

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Fruits of Practice

A Comparative Analysis of Li Zehou's Concept of Sedimentation and the Buddhist Idea of the Transformations of Storehouse Consciousness (*Ālaya*)

DAWID ROGACZ

The concept of sedimentation (*jidian* 积淀) plays a pivotal role in the philosophy of Li Zehou. While the term *jidian* was coined by Li himself as a metaphor of the geological settling of layers of sand and dust, its connotations cross-refer to a family of more or less similar ideas. Among them, Li explicitly mentions the Piagetian theory of cognitive development;¹ there are also significant links between Li Zehou's notion of sedimentation and recent discoveries in evolutionary psychology and paleoarcheology.² Most importantly, Li's idea of sedimentation is deeply rooted in the processual nature of classical Chinese (and particularly Confucian) philosophy, giving a dialectical and also transcendental twist to its approach to subjectivity.

This essay explores the alternative "family resemblance" by means of examining the parallels between Li Zehou's concept of sedimentation (particularly with reference to mental structures) and the idea of the transformations of storehouse consciousness (*ālaya vijñāna*) in Yogācāra Buddhism. Notably, it is not claimed that Li Zehou "took" from Yogācāra, as there are no traces of such borrowing.³ Both ideas are rather expressions of a more fundamental paradigm that manifests itself in a dynamic

1 way of thinking that sees reality as perpetually changing. However, the
 2 affinity between Li's theory of sedimentation, on the one hand, and
 3 some views on the transformations of the storehouse consciousness, on
 4 the other, is striking and intriguing, and given the influential position of
 5 the Yogācāra in the landscape of twentieth-century Chinese philosophy,⁴
 6 its actual impact cannot be fully ruled out.

7 This is all the more surprising as Li Zehou's account of Buddhist
 8 thought is not particularly charitable. Li often treats Buddhism as the
 9 epitome of fanaticism, an apology for suffering, or a religious narcotic
 10 conducive to the maintenance of feudal society,⁵ a perspective clearly
 11 indebted to the Marxist critique of religion. As Sandra Wawrytko points
 12 out, Li Zehou interprets Buddhism (at best) "as a catalyst for rather than
 13 a major component of Chinese philosophy," whose main philosophical
 14 contributions are not far from the assumptions of Confucian thought.⁶
 15 Intrigued by this, Wawrytko traces the tacit influence of the Buddhist-
 16 Confucian compound on Li's aesthetics, specifically the aesthetical version
 17 of his view on the "humanization of nature."⁷ I would like to argue that
 18 the parallels between the thought of Li Zehou and Buddhist philoso-
 19 phy may go even further and concern the very understanding of the
 20 "mechanism" of sedimentation, which bears significant similarities with
 21 the Yogācārist idea of the transformations of storehouse consciousness,
 22 mostly as elaborated in *Mahāyāna Saṃgraha* and *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. And
 23 while this particular comparison might be controversial, it is noteworthy
 24 that attempts to demonstrate the complementarity of some Marxist and
 25 Buddhist categories are not new, since they date back to the writings
 26 of Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1891–1956) and have recently taken a
 27 deserved place in academic debates due to, among others, Graham Priest.⁸

30 Coagulated Seeds: Yogācāra on the Generation and 31 Transformation of Individual Consciousness

32
 33 The concept of storehouse consciousness (*ālaya vijñāna*) has a long his-
 34 tory that predates the emergence of the Yogācāra school.⁹ Early Buddhist
 35 philosophy already contained an idea of the underlying latent dispositions
 36 (*anusaya*), which are psycho-ontologically instrumental in perpetuating
 37 saṃsāric existence. As *Samyutta Nikāya* (S II 66) reads, "If, monks, one
 38 does not intend, and one does not plan, but one still has a tendency
 39 towards (*anuseti*) something, this becomes a basis for the maintenance of
 40

consciousness.”¹⁰ It is because all these tendencies give rise to an unending series of conceptual proliferation (*prapañca*).¹¹ Questions about the exact mechanism of such proliferation, and regarding its “place” and ways to overcome it, led to the emergence of the concept of *ālaya*.

Essentially, the concept of *ālaya vijñāna* was introduced to denote both the storer of impressions (the “backup” for consciousness) and that which is stored. Since conscious life is an end product of its fluctuations, ultimately we have no (conscious) control over the transformation of the impressions of our past experiences into the objects of cognition.¹² According to *Mahāyāna Saṃgraha* (MSg I.3), “It is called *ālaya vijñāna* because all afflicted dharmas which have an origin dwell (*ālīyante*) in this [*vijñāna*] as a fruit (*phalabhāva*), and because this [*vijñāna*] also dwells in them as cause (*hetubhāva*).”¹³ “Fruit” serves here as more than a metaphor, as the first phase of dependent arising (MSg I.26–28) refers to the emergence of the manifest forms of cognitive awareness (*pravṛtti vijñāna*) out of that which had been experienced (*aupabhogika*) in all the past existences. *Ālaya* is, therefore, understood both in transcendental (“the storer”) and psycho-genetic (“the stored”) terms. On the one hand, in principle, “without that [*ālaya vijñāna*], existence (*bhāva*) conditioned by appropriation (*upādāna*) would also be impossible” (MSg I.33). Yet, on the other, from the viewpoint of the result of such conditioning, “*vijñāna* coagulates (*saṃ mūrcchati*) as an embryo in the mother’s womb” (MSg I.34).¹⁴ In this sense, the process of the coagulation of the seeds (*bīja*) of past actions guarantees the psycho-physical (that is, empirical) continuum of an individual.

From such a viewpoint it is clear that each individual has her or his own *ālaya*. However, as an ever-changing process, a simultaneously “perfumed” and “perfuming” entity, *ālaya* is not to be confused with the idea of permanent self, although in the opinion of Paul Williams it does “give a degree of personal identity.”¹⁵ In fact, the illusion of a permanent self is a product of the transformation of *ālaya*, resulting from the emergence of reflexive consciousness (*mānas vijñāna*). But if it is *mānas vijñāna* that creates the mental image of one’s ego and erroneously regards its cognitive processes as belonging to some self, so that the self/I is not to be found in the *ālaya* itself, then why suppose that *ālaya* is individually differentiated? Such questions led to the interfusion of the Yogācāra school with the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, as best exemplified by the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*.

For the authors of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, *ālaya* is basically and perfectly one. It is an unconditional absolute, comparable to a vast

1 ocean unmoved by the churning of waves. For this reason, *ālaya* is seen
 2 as the noetic aspect of Suchness (*Tathatā*), “the conscious modality of
 3 *Tathatā* [that] grounds and animates the individual human psyche whose
 4 form s are the immanent transformations of (the *Alaya*) itself.”¹⁶ It also
 5 means that the totality of phenomenal beings is nothing other than self-
 6 manifesting Mind. In this way, however, as Brian E. Brown points out,
 7 the *Lañkāvatāra Sūtra* confuses ontology with epistemology, which in his
 8 eyes also jeopardizes the value of human subjectivity.¹⁷ This opinion may
 9 be accurate due to the link that the *Lañkāvatāra Sūtra* makes between
 10 the way-things-truly-are (Suchness) and our cognitive objects. On the
 11 other hand, such a connection is to some extent unavoidable, given that
 12 our conceptualizations are karmically determined, while these karmic
 13 seeds come from our actions, which change the world itself. *Mahāyāna*
 14 *Samgraha*, too, quite literally states that dharmas dwell in *ālaya* and that
 15 the causal chain of dependence arising due to their accumulation is,
 16 par excellence, real. In other words, the transformation of *ālaya* may be
 17 justifiably interpreted as a psycho-ontological process. As such, it bears
 18 some affinity with the way the Chinese philosopher Li Zehou understands
 19 the process of “sedimentation.”

20 21 22 Subject in the Making: 23 Li Zehou’s Concept of Sedimentation 24

25 Li Zehou’s notion of sedimentation grows out of his innovative and
 26 controversial reading of Kantian philosophy, specifically from the his-
 27 torization of his transcendentalism. What Kant took to be a priori—the
 28 universal and necessary structures of subjective cognition—are in Li’s
 29 eyes nothing but the result/fruit (*chengguo* 成果) of the historical, and
 30 are therefore also the contingent experience of humanity, the experience
 31 that is carried on now and in future generations.¹⁸ Li’s provocative take
 32 on Kantianism is justified by the fact that while Kant elaborated on the
 33 transcendental character of categories, he did not explain their source.¹⁹
 34 Strictly speaking, Kant could not provide such an explanation, as the
 35 categories are transcendental in the sense that they are the condition
 36 of all possible experience, but they themselves cannot derive from any
 37 (possible) experience; otherwise they would not be a priori. In all fair-
 38 ness, Li admits that his interpretation requires a clearly non-Kantian
 39 assumption, namely that enduring forms of experience can be and are
 40

transformed into the transcendental (*jingyan bian xianyan* 经验变先验).²⁰ 1
The exact shape of such transformation is explained by the concept of 2
sedimentation: “In short, that which seems to be ‘transcendental’ to an 3
individual is actually sedimentation, which has been historically acquired 4
through the collective experience of humankind.”²¹ 5

By stating this, Li fully endorses the historicization of the tran- 6
scendental, if not interpreting transcendentalism itself as essentially a 7
genealogical enterprise. This, however, as pointed out by Ady Van den 8
Stock, entails precluding any bifurcation between the conditioned and 9
unconditioned, namely that which is supposedly independent of all expe- 10
rience.²² Consequently, Li Zehou undermines another crucial distinction 11
of modern Western philosophy, namely that between humans and nature. 12
In Li’s own words, sedimentation refers to “the accumulations and deposits 13
of the social, rational, and historical in the individual through the process 14
of humanizing nature.”²³ The humanization of nature—a concept taken 15
from Marxian philosophy—relates to the specifically human process of 16
transforming both external and inner nature. While the humanization of 17
external nature results in the creation of material civilization, and thus 18
technical-social structures (*gongyi shehui jiegou* 工艺社会结构), the trans- 19
formation of inner human nature(s) generates cultural-mental formations 20
(*wenhua xinli jiegou* 文化心理结构).²⁴ As Sylvia Chan points out, the latter 21
“refers to the mental powers individuals have: cognition, emotion, and 22
volition.”²⁵ In this way, the collective “subjectality” (*zhutixing* 主體性) 23
shapes individual subjectivity (*zhuguanxing* 主觀性). On the other hand, 24
since sedimentation “stores human experiences and shapes collective 25
memory,”²⁶ human subjectivities are being molded from practical trans- 26
formations of the objective world, which leads to the complementary 27
process of the “naturalization of humans” (*ren de ziranhua* 人的自然化) and 28
enables Li Zehou to engage in a dialogue with evolutionary psychology. 29

Importantly, the concept of the naturalization of humans involves 30
not all experiences, but one particular experience that according to Li 31
genuinely shapes our cognitive faculties: the manufacturing and use of tools 32
(*shiyong-zhizao gongju* 使用—制造工具). For this reason, Li Zehou eagerly 33
puts forward a number of concrete hypotheses regarding the origin of 34
language or motor thinking.²⁷ This aspect of his theory of sedimentation, 35
however, is not evolutionistic (Darwinian), but essentially Lamarckian. 36
The accumulation of experiences, or rather features acquired during the 37
practical taming of reality and under the influence of current needs, is 38
gradually “transcendentalized,” thus extending human cognitive abilities. 39
40

1 It is not merely about “the survival of the fittest” when it comes to
 2 those preestablished and arbitrarily found faculties that happen to adapt
 3 to reality in the way that makes their survival possible. No matter how
 4 these faculties are shaped, at a certain stage of technological development
 5 the production and use of tools actively and continuously transforms and
 6 expands them, and there seems to be no room for pure contingency in
 7 this process. On the other hand, Jane Cauvel argues that there are two
 8 more meanings of sedimentation present in Li Zehou’s theory: cultural,
 9 referring to the accumulation of the customs of thinking and feeling,
 10 and individual, pertaining to the accretion of personal experiences during
 11 one’s own life.²⁸ The latter two are clearly “Lamarckian” in the sense
 12 discussed above, which means that even if Li’s transformivist approach
 13 to human subjectivity remains controversial from the scientific viewpoint,
 14 it is definitely consistent with the actual development of human culture
 15 and the way we live our own lives.

16 At the end of the day, however, Li Zehou’s concept of sedimenta-
 17 tion should be read not as a scientific hypothesis, but as a philosophical
 18 theory of human subjectivity and culture that quite effectively interprets
 19 it on the scale of the *longue durée*. In his interpretation of the course of
 20 Chinese culture, which given its universal claims can possibly be related
 21 to other cultures as well, Li Zehou argues that the humanization of
 22 inner nature took place due to shamanistic activities, so that “all kinds
 23 of uniquely human psychological functions, like imagination, cognition,
 24 comprehension, and other intellectual activities, sprouted and developed
 25 while preserving their connection to elementary animalistic mental
 26 functions.”²⁹ These activities themselves are described by Li as “based
 27 upon a unity of body and mind and by no means separated soul and
 28 flesh. They attached importance to the very process of activity and not
 29 to its objects.”³⁰ This means that human subjectivity has been historically
 30 shaped through the collective practice of shamanistic transformation, or,
 31 using Li Zehou’s terminology, that individual “small self” (*xiaowo* 小我)
 32 has been created, or sedimented, out of the collective “greater self” (*dawo*
 33 大我)—a communal form of consciousness. The collective consciousness
 34 is logically and historically prior to the individual self.³¹ For this reason,
 35 Li Zehou understands this process in transcendental terms: “just as in
 36 the case of material production, I insist that without the activities of the
 37 collective social consciousness, i.e., without primitive shamanist ritual
 38 activities and without linguistic and symbolic activities, the formation of
 39 a human psyche that is different from that of the animals would not have
 40 been possible.”³² At the stage of this initial and elementary sedimentation,

as Marthe Chandler reminds us, humans had much less sense of themselves as individuals than in the modern era; losing themselves in these collective activities, they “were in a sense ‘one being’ with one set of intentions, desires, and goals.”³³ Treating shamanistic activities on a par with material technological practice may be surprising, but, as a matter of fact, magic and rituals were the first efforts to tame and manipulate nature, even phenomena seemingly beyond human control.

It has to be observed, however, that Li’s focus on the long-range sedimentation of external nature and collective inner nature (and generally his almost post-structuralist understanding of subjectivity) could raise some questions about the extent to which the processes in question may be described as autonomous and free. Li Zehou himself was well aware of this theoretical problem and addressed it mostly in his *Historical Ontology* (*Lishi bentilun* 历史本体论). First of all, the manufacturing and use of tools is a variant form of the process of measuring (*du* 度), which is practiced everyday by all human beings in all spheres of their *Lebenswelt*; in this sense, the substance/body (*wuti* 物体) of history is tantamount to social life.³⁴ All such acts are free within the limits of the current level of technological and economic development. They are necessary only in the long term and post factum: it is from the viewpoint of time that we see that some things could not have happened otherwise, but it is impossible to predict in advance which single practice should necessarily lead to what sort of structures. All these stipulations notwithstanding, Li argues, the necessity arising from long-term practices of manipulating and transforming nature, resulting in sedimented mental formations (*xinli xingshi* 心理形式), is no less fundamental than economic relations, although its pivotal role was long omitted by Marxists.³⁵ People are both the products and creators of history. And since “people actively create their own history, they take moral responsibility for their choices.”³⁶ Sedimentation does not overrule this responsibility, but in fact it strengthens it, showing that the results of human practices are, in the strict sense, historical, and that what emerges from this process is ultimately nothing but the human subject itself.

A Comparison

This often neglected ethical dimension of sedimentation provides further opportunities for an effective comparison between the Yogācāra concept of the subject (specifically the version from the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*) and

1 Li Zehou's approach to subjectivity. In terms of the theoretical structure
 2 of these two conceptions, there are some intriguing and deep similarities
 3 and differences that need to be pointed out.

4 First, similarly to the transformation of storehouse consciousness,
 5 sedimentation can be described as a process, to use Rošker's formulation
 6 once again, that "stores human experiences and shapes collective mem-
 7 ory." Second, all these experiences come from free actions or practices,
 8 for which their agents bear moral responsibility. Third, both systems use
 9 similar imagery: whereas for Yogācāra this process is portrayed as a coag-
 10 ulation of the seeds of actions, Li Zehou depicts it as a sedimentation of
 11 the fruits (*chengguo*) of practices. Fourth, the result of this process—the
 12 "coagulated seeds" or "sedimented fruits"—are nothing but the manifest
 13 forms of cognitive awareness or consciousness in the language of Yogācāra,
 14 or mental or cultural-psychological formations/structures (or simply cate-
 15 gories of cognition) in the vocabulary of Li Zehou. Fifth, both approaches
 16 go further and state that what is transformed or sedimented is actually
 17 the individual subject itself (the individual self). For this reason, they
 18 introduce a communal form of consciousness—*ālaya* or *dawo*, which as
 19 an entity that logically precedes the creation of strictly cognitive fac-
 20 ulties is also described in a more ontological way: as noetic Suchness
 21 or subjectality (*zhutixing*, literally "body-nature of the subject"). This is
 22 connected with the sixth affinity between these two conceptions. Both Li
 23 Zehou and the Yogācārins understand the generation of subject(-ivity) in
 24 both transcendental and psycho-ontological ways. It is, on the one hand,
 25 something without which individual consciousness would not be possible;
 26 on the other hand, the sedimentation or transformation of *ālaya* both
 27 refer to the actual, "psycho-genetic" process that is extended throughout
 28 the generations. From a bird's eye view, Li's struggles to present Kan-
 29 tian categories as the "sediments" of the practice of manufacturing and
 30 using tools are akin to Vasubandhu's efforts to root reason qua reflexive
 31 consciousness (*mānas vijñāna*), understanding/apperception qua mental
 32 consciousness (*manovijñāna*), and six sensory consciousnesses, into a deeper
 33 repository of the results of human actions. Finally, both Li Zehou and the
 34 Yogācārins operate on the scale of the *longue durée* and do not assume
 35 that every individual and every generation writes history anew: just as
 36 the way one's world is seen in the current life is a result of the actions
 37 from all previous lives, so contemporary subjectivity should be seen as
 38 an effect of the long-term transformations of subjectality starting, at the
 39 very latest, from the shamanistic humanization of nature.

40

Despite all these resemblances, none were spotted by either Li Zehou or the scholars of his thought. Of course, in order to make such a comparison feasible we need to make an assumption enabling us to read Yogācāra (also) as a philosophy of history. Such a reading, however, was not alien to modern Chinese philosophers due to the contribution of Zhang Taiyan (also known as Zhang Binglin, 1869–1936). As Viren Murthy observes, “Zhang explains the objectivity of history and time using the concepts of Yogācāra Buddhism” based on the idea that “karmic seeds produce phenomena and are stored in *ālaya* consciousness.”³⁷ As Murthy continues, in Zhang’s view the collective karma stored in *ālaya* drives history and is responsible for the biological evolution of species from “the earliest amoeba” up to the emergence of human beings out of the realm of animals.³⁸ These ideas could certainly be viewed as an attempt to modernize Yogācāra in dialogue with both Hegelianism and evolutionism, and eventually even as the missing link between classical Yogācāra and Li’s concept of sedimentation. This is not, however, the way Li Zehou interpreted Zhang Taiyan. In his eyes, the evolution Zhang Taiyan speaks about is a spiritual rather than a biological process. As such, it is a mere “reactionary speculation” that mirrors the capitalist mode of production that Zhang (allegedly) stood behind. And as if this typically Marxist criticism was not enough, Zhang’s philosophy is also described as “relativist,” “cabalistic,” and “nihilist,” falling back from transcendentalism to the “subjective idealism” of Buddhist epistemology, which does not go beyond the phenomena of sensual experience.³⁹

However, as uncharitable as such a reading may be, it certainly follows crucial discrepancies between the Yogācārist and Li’s approaches to subjectivity. First of all, Yogācāra Buddhism is still a form of idealist philosophy, be it subjective or even transcendental. The quoted sutras clearly state that the perceived and cognized reality is the manifestation of reflexive consciousness and *ālaya*, and not vice versa. That the “material” for these manifestations may come from external stimuli (a view held explicitly by, for example, Xuanzang) does not change the fact that it is various forms of consciousness that determine how these entities are synthesized into meaningful phenomena. Li Zehou, on the other hand, openly advocates the dependence of the cultural and mental “superstructure” upon the economic and technological base, although he insists that Marxism has to be purged of all elements that do not belong to the core of historical materialism (*weiwu shiguan de hexin* 唯物史观的核心), namely the idea of the constitutive role of the manufacturing

1 and use of tools.⁴⁰ Second, consequently, the practice Li Zehou has in
 2 mind refers mostly to the use of tools, and more generally to all forms
 3 of manipulative and harmonizing measuring (*du*). In Yogācāra the seeds
 4 are brought about by all kinds of acts, and those of a non-instrumental
 5 nature are probably even more saturated with karmic significance.

6 Third, Yogācāra does presuppose the existence of two or—counting
 7 the world of dreams—three realms of being (*trisvabhāva*). Specifically,
 8 the unconditioned, non-dual and perfect reality, Suchness or *ālaya* is
 9 distinct from, if not opposed to, impermanent and imperfect phenom-
 10 ena. Such dualism is openly rejected by Li Zehou, and his “one-world
 11 view” is strengthened by a radical endorsement of historicism. The
 12 fourth significant difference regards the mechanism of subject-making
 13 in both approaches. In Yogācāra, *ālaya* stores the seeds from a person’s
 14 own actions and transmits them to the next lives of that individual: the
 15 subject, its consciousness—and the world of experience such conscious-
 16 ness presents is the result of her or his own actions “saved” within *ālaya*.
 17 For Li Zehou, in turn, modern subjectivity, and therefore the cognitive
 18 faculties of contemporary human subjects, result from the collective long-
 19 term practice of all humanity. This entails another difference between
 20 the two views. Although the Yogācārist account clearly guarantees the
 21 continuity and accumulation of the fruits of one’s deeds, it does not
 22 necessarily imply any progression or improvement in this process. Due to
 23 the transmission of bad karma, things can actually go from bad to worse.
 24 Li Zehou believes, on the other hand, that since the manufacturing and
 25 use of tools serves as an instrument in adapting to external reality, with
 26 proper effort sedimentation and the accompanying “peaceful evolution”
 27 (*heping jinhua* 和平進化) will lead to the increasing amelioration (*gailiang*
 28 改良) of social life.⁴¹ Needless to say, Li Zehou lacks the soteriological
 29 perspective of Yogācāra Buddhism. But even assuming that the notion
 30 of revolution constitutes, to some extent, the Marxist counterpart of
 31 the idea of liberation (salvation), the views of the Yogācārins and Li
 32 Zehou could not be more different. While for the former the only way to
 33 liberation lies in the disruption of the stream of karmic seeds, Li Zehou
 34 condemns revolutions and all other disruptive forms of social liberation
 35 as utopian, counter-effective and simply dangerous.⁴²

36 All these differences, however, do not overrule the affinities in
 37 their understanding of the genesis of the subject: for both Yogācārins
 38 and Li Zehou, individual subjectivity and its cognitive faculties are the
 39 long-term result of the sedimentation (coagulation) of the results of
 40

human action (practice), which are collectively stored and transmitted through generations. The view of Li Zehou may be interpreted as a materialist, historicist, collectivist, and antiutopian “philosophical nephew” of Yogācāra thought, with both belonging to a larger, transformativist and processual philosophical family of the conceptions of subjectivity.

Notes

1. Cf. Jana S. Rošker, “Human Memory as a Dynamic Accumulation of Experiences: Li Zehou’s Concept of Sedimentation,” *Ars and Humanitas* 12, no. 2 (2018): 135–37.

2. Marthe Chandler, “Li Zehou, Kant, and Darwin: The Theory of Sedimentation,” in *Li Zehou and Confucian Philosophy*, ed. Roger T. Ames and Jinhua Jia (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2018), 279–312.

3. Quite tellingly, Yogācāra is entirely omitted in Li’s overview of Chinese philosophy; see *Zhongguo gudai sixiang shilun* 中國古代思想史論 (*A History of Classical Chinese Thought*) (Beijing: Xinhua Shudian, 2008), 208–30.

4. John Makeham, ed., *On Transforming Consciousness: Yogacara Thought in Modern China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

5. Li Zehou, *The Path of Beauty: A Study of Chinese Aesthetics*, trans. Song Lizeng (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1994), 107–13, 126.

6. Sandra A. Wawrytko, “Sedimentation in Chinese Aesthetics and Epistemology: A Buddhist Expansion of Confucian Philosophy,” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 40, no. 3–4 (2013): 477–79.

7. Wawrytko, 485–89.

8. Graham Priest, *Capitalism—its Nature and its Replacement: Buddhist and Marxist Insights* (New York: Routledge, 2021). For a synoptic view on Priest’s approach to the complementarity of Buddhism and Marxism, see Graham Priest, “Marxism and Buddhism: Not Such Strange Bedfellows,” *Journal of the American Philosophical Association* 4, no. 1 (2018): 2–13. Cf. also Karsten J. Stuhl, “Buddhism and Marxism: Points of Intersection,” *International Communication of Chinese Culture* 4 (2017): 103–16.

9. For the classical philological and historical study of that concept, see Lambert Schmithausen, *Ālāyavijñāna. On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogacara Philosophy* (Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1987).

10. Translated by William S. Waldron, *The Buddhist Unconscious: The alaya-vijñāna in the Context of Indian Buddhist Thought* (London: Routledge, 2003), 35.

11. See Waldron, *The Buddhist Unconscious*, 33–37.

12. Shun'ei Tagawa, *Living Yogacara: An Introduction to Consciousness-only Buddhism* (Somerville: Wisdom Publications, 2009), 29–37.
13. Cited from Waldron, *The Buddhist Unconscious*, 130.
14. Waldron, *The Buddhist unconscious*, 140–41.
15. Paul Williams, *Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 97–99.
16. Brian E. Brown, *The Buddha Nature: A Study of the Tathāgatagarbha and Ālayavijñāna* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1991), 183–84.
17. Brown, *The Buddha Nature*, 188, 192.
18. Li Zehou 李澤厚, *Pīpan zhexue de pīpan: Kangde shuping 批判哲學的批判: 康德述評 (Critique of Critical Philosophy: A Commentary on Kant)*, 6th ed. (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 2007), 70–72.
19. Cf. passages A 95–96 of Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. P. Guyer and A. W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 226–27.
20. See Jana S. Rošker, *Following His Own Path: Li Zehou and Contemporary Chinese Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2019), 28.
21. Li Zehou, *A New Approach to Kant. A Confucian-Marxist's Viewpoint*, trans. J. H. Allen (Singapore: Springer, 2008), viii.
22. Ady Van den Stock, "Imprints of the Thing in Itself: Li Zehou's *Critique of Critical Philosophy* and the Historicization of the Transcendental," *Asian Studies* 8, no. 1 (2020): 17.
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